The Pub

Phenomenology of Flirtation

Marty Jones

It is a truth universally acknowledged that Wheaton students are attractive, interesting, funny and smart. Most of us fall between the ages of 18 and 22. The majority of us are single, and furthermore do not wish to remain so – but ironically, many of us are also sensitive to a powerful fear of commitment. Conditions are perfect, as one member of Flight of the Conchords might say, for widespread, wanton, irresponsible acts of flirtation. The likelihood increases with each degree Fahrenheit above freezing, each ray of sunshine that reaches our winter-swept faces and each minute of daylight maintained during dinner – Spring is a season for playing all kinds of games.

Flirting can be a thrillingly positive experience; it can also turn into a terrifyingly negative experience. I know something about shaky hands, flittering heart-valves and straining just to get words out of a stubborn throat. I’ve broken into sweat at the unintended (was it unintended? was it unintended???) touch of a girl’s hand, subjected a single kind word to a dozen hermeneutics resulting in a million different interpretations, and directed numerous conversations in such a way as to tacitly suggest to my interlocutor that I, Marty Jones, am interested (I think?) and would be interested in your being interested too, please. I love the adrenaline kick that comes with successful attempts at flirtation – like the moment after she flashes that suggestive smile in response to your (possibly) clever quip. The uncertainty and the memory of past failures add an element of danger; I will never forget one experience of trying to flirt with an acquaintance by pretend-menacing her with a taut rubber band, which I, of course, accidentally loosed – directly into her eye, making her cry and destroying my chances of successful flirting with her forever.[1] Though the statistics to support the claim do not exist, who would disagree that flirting is tremendously popular – at Wheaton and at every other college and university?

I would like to clarify what exactly is involved in the act of flirtation from the perspective of the flirter, for two reasons: one, to increase self-awareness (and perhaps for some, self-possession), so that regardless of what we do and how we go about doing it, we may at least know that we are doing something and hopefully have an insight into our reasons for doing it; two, to raise practical questions for our community having to do with the essence of the act of flirtation that I hope to identify. Why do we flirt so much here, anyway?

If you are reading this, I take it that you know something about the subject, and that you’ve earned your knowledge through experience. This is important. I am peering into this well of embarrassing memories in hopes of discerning the essential structure of the act of flirtation by way of a roughly phenomenological method. Phenomenology, for present purposes, will be understood as a way of clarifying our conscious experiences of things; it is an attitude of reflective analysis applied to our unreflective acts in order to bring to light the essential threads that hold those acts together – the aspects or structures without which each act of X could not be an act of X. Since all of the data entering into consideration are derived from experiences of the thing being described, it is up to every reader (and flirt) to decide whether what is said rings true when the tuning fork of their own experience is struck against this analysis.

So, what is flirtation, then? First, some qualifiers.

Some uses of “flirtation” are intended more metaphorically than literally. The quasi-flirtatious modes that fall within this category include flirting with ideas, “flirting” with different options in the course of one’s deliberations about mundane decisions, and flirting with a person whom one does not regard with a minimal level of sexual attraction (for example, a teenager “flirting” with an old woman at a nursing home, as a way of being kind). The more literal subset of the broader category of “flirtation” that I intend to explore is dependent upon meeting this minimum threshold level of sexual attraction in the flirter towards the one being flirted with. This type of flirting, then, the essence of which I intend to tease out, is a purposeful way of relating to another subject in whom one finds some cause for sexual/romantic interest.

I think this narrowing move is justified because I take it to be obvious that many instances of flirtation in the broader sense involve some level of sexual attraction on the part of the flirter towards the one flirted with (the “flirtee” from here onwards), and so I have only limited the analysis to those particular cases. The minimal level of sexual attraction will necessarily remain unspecific, but, as the U.S. Supreme Court pronounced regarding the question of identifying pornography, “you know it when you see it” – in the case of this essence, perhaps, you know it when you feel it. Additionally, I will restrict the analysis to flirtation from the perspective of the one who flirts, without the assumption that the flirtee is willfully reciprocating with her own acts of flirtation. The flirter could in principle be flirting with someone who is totally uninterested or unaware of his flirtatiousness, and if the analysis is accurate, his flirting would still need to be formally constituted according to these structures.

With prefatory comments out of the way, I will begin with a description of particular instances of the act under investigation.[2] Mark sits with his friend Anna on a couch, ostensibly to study together; their shoulders touch in spite of there being room for them to sit distinctly apart, and conversation continually tends towards their personal lives, at Mark’s gentle direction.

In another instance, Matt heatedly argues with Allison; the conversation ends with her punching him repeatedly as he ridicules her. However, both are laughing, and the argument turns out to have been artificial.

In a final example, Murray makes repeated eye contact with Abby from across a crowded table. Both are involved in conversations with other people nearer to them, but Murray makes a point of drawing Abby’s attention to his glances at her, which he moves to hide in the moment of her meeting them.

These are all instances of the type of behavior I have identified so far as flirtation involving sexual attraction, with the flirtation in each case being intended necessarily by M, and plausibly (but not necessarily) reciprocated by A.

The first essential aspect that I imagine to be partially constitutive of this type of flirtatious act is its game-like structure. The game-like aspects I would emphasize include the acknowledgement of and adherence to a constitutive set of rules, and an ability to abandon the game at any time by discontinuing one’s regard for those rules. In each of the examples of flirtation above, M could have made moves going beyond the implicit pale of acceptable flirtatious behavior – in example one, M could have asked rude or invasive questions about the personal life of A, or initiated too much physical touch; in the second example, M could have actually physically hurt A or pushed the argument out of the bounds of ironic playfulness; in example three, M could have stared without abatement or explanation at A until her discomfort grew to a level sufficient to compel her to leave the table. The game-like experience of flirtation, I would again emphasize, does not depend on the flirtatious behavior’s being deliberately reciprocated by the flirtee, as much as the examples seem to suggest. Given the indirectness of flirtation (a second essential structure discussed below), it is not easy to identify in the course of conversation, and it is comparatively easy for the flirter to deny in the case of an accusation; most people will tolerate being flirted with to a certain degree in the case of the flirtation being unwelcome, since it is difficult in this way to successfully call it out. Additionally, barring the suspicion of ulterior motives on the part of the flirter, it is flattering to be flirted with, which may increase the tolerance of the flirtee for the flirter’s flirtatious acts without compelling the flirtee to reciprocate.) In each of these cases, the rules are unique to the situation, established with the initiation of each particular game as the flirter starts to pick up on the attitude of the flirtee towards him and his acts of flirtation.

The particular rules governing flirtatious behavior are distinct from those governing social interactions generally; to wit, following general social conventions may in some cases signal or result in the canceling of flirtatious behavior, as the rules of the latter game may exceed or even oppose those of the former. For example, Merty (a good friend of mine) may try to flirt, with some success, with a coworker, Angelina, each day at the typical workplace water cooler. She seems generally receptive to his quirky humor and way of revealing too much about himself in conversation, but one day is overcome with guilt over allowing Merty to play the game to her in spite of her having a serious boyfriend (of whom, it ought to be said, Merty knows nothing). To signal to Merty that his flirting is no longer okay and that his game ought to be canceled, Angelina interacts with Merty on a purely formal level, operating strictly according to the tacit rules of general workplace conduct. She is polite and cordial and businesslike and totally uninterested in being flirted with, and as a result, Merty’s game is finished.

This essential structure of flirtation manifests itself in the flirter’s experience of a compelling need to abide by the rules of the game as they are determined in each instance of flirtation. These rules are discerned through the flirter’s capacity to empathize with the one being flirted-with, so as to allow the flirter to represent to himself the flirtee’s levels of receptivity (or mere tolerance) towards the flirter’s flirting.[3] Disregarding the implicit rules of flirtation would be tantamount to entering into a new mode of relating to the flirtee – as in the preceding example, Merty could at any point have disregarded the rules of the particular game being played with Angelina so as to relate to her not as a flirtee, but strictly as a coworker, something he ends up being forced to do. Disregarding the rules of a game is a common way of signaling to other participants that one is no longer interested in playing.

A second every-present aspect that may turn out to be an essential structure of flirtation is its indirectness. In each of the initial examples, M never acknowledges to his intended flirtee that he is flirting with her, even though he is. Flirtation never enters into the explicit content of his actions towards her, and were it to explicitly enter into the content of his actions, the act would change from flirtation into another active way of relating. The factual content of a flirter’s actions is almost infinitely variable – from the personal line of questioning pursued by M in example one, to the ironic attacks on A in example two, to the wordless but suggestive soliciting of eye contact in example three.  I can flirt verbally or nonverbally, at greater and lesser levels of intensity, in acts determined by my understanding of the implicitly acknowledged rules of my interaction with my flirtee.

Could flirtation, based on a minimal degree of sexual attraction towards the flirtee on the part of the flirter, be possible without being indirect? A direct statement of a flirter’s intention to flirt could conceivably be made between periods of sustained flirtation, but could the statement itself – “I am flirting with you” – be flirtatious? This would depend on the level of irony in the communication of the intention – the width of the flirter’s smile as he says to the flirtee that he is flirting with her, perhaps. This is because irony is essential to the implicit sense of the rules of the game of flirtation; the need for flirtation to be communicated through indirect or ironic acts of communication is in fact the cardinal rule of the game, since a direct, straight-faced initiation of the same actions would effectively change the meaning of the flirter’s particular acts and even the game, so that he is no longer flirting at all – imagine M mercilessly insulting A without any indication that he does not mean what he is saying. Furthermore irony is a primary mode of purposeful indirect communication.

Enough wink-wink ironic playfulness could compensate for the breaking of the cardinal rule of the game, but to remain flirtatious, the statement would need to be rectified in the moment of its utterance. In this way a direct statement of a flirter’s intent to flirt could remain itself flirtation, if the ‘sin’ of the direct utterance were to be ‘atoned for’ within the system of implicit rules in the moment of its being committed by a sufficient level of ironic playfulness, as ironic playfulness is also the currency of right action within the rule-governed realm of flirtatious behavior. If the sin remains unatoned-for within the system of implicit rules – if the flirter maintains a straight face and serious demeanor in directly addressing his flirtatiousness – then not only the rule, but the game itself is broken. It is disregarded by the former participant, signaling a disregard for the flirtee-as-flirtee, and by extension the flirtee as conceivably unwitting arbiter of the rules governing the flirtatiousness of the flirter. However, this move also initiates a new regard for the former flirtee as a fellow subject considered (and related to) in a new way.

The two preceding essential structures of flirtation for the flirter are jointly sufficient for a third structure, which I have just introduced. This would be the status of the flirtee as the arbiter of the rules and supreme judge of the performance of the flirter in the arena of his game. This results from a synergistic combination of general precepts of right conduct in public space, and the particular mood and mindset of the flirtee in the moment of the flirter’s initiation of his game, which determines the kinds of flirtatious acts the flirter believes he can successfully initiate. It is not necessary for the flirtee to consciously accept the role of arbiter and judge, as I have tried to indicate; the status is an imaginative product of the flirter dependent on the flirter’s perception of the attitude of the flirtee towards his flirtation. He responds, in the course of the game, to the signs expressed in the face and words of the flirtee as a morally-developing child responds to the reprimands and praises of an authority figure; they help him to course-correct and stay within the bounds of acceptable behavior.

However, unlike the authority figure, the flirtee may give signs of approval and disapproval without conscious awareness – through unconscious signals of discomfort, such as awkwardness in body language and facial expression, or other modes of revealing that go beyond what she purposes to reveal in communication.  It is important for the flirter, in the course of playing his game, to minimize these moments of discomfort and tacit disapproval in the flirtee; if they are allowed to develop into being the salient aspects of the flirter-flirtee interaction, the flirtee will be compelled to discern the source of the discomfort in order to stop it. This would force the acts of flirtation into explicit thematic awareness on the part of the flirtee, whether she had been tacitly aware or unaware of them before. Explicit thematic awareness in the flirtee (and, flirtee forbid, verbal acknowledgement of this awareness) would be sufficient to kill the flirter’s game, without the saving grace of ironic playfulness since the flirtee’s discomfort and desire for relief from it would have already eliminated any recognition of the flirter’s intended ironic playfulness. For the flirter, this again is final judgment and functional apocalypse,[4] and so we have revealed a second deadly offense within the rule-governed system of flirtation: ineptitude. The flirter is therefore aware of a need for competent irony in attempting to flirt; the game of flirtation may be canceled as a result of one’s deficiency just as it may be canceled by one’s sin of directness and seriousness, in the eyes of the subject-supposed-to be arbiter, judge, and referee.

In the preceding discussion, flirtation (narrowed to a kind expressed by a flirter in whom has been met a minimum level of sexual attraction towards the intended flirtee) has been found to have three essential structures: flirtation is experienced by the flirter as a rule-governed game-like activity, with rules established (not necessarily by conscious intent) by the flirtee, and as an extension of this first aspect, flirtation is essentially indirect and ironic – there is a necessary disconnect between a flirter’s literal acts and their actual intended meaning, and outside of special conditions obtaining, a direct acknowledgement on the part of the flirter of his flirtatiousness destroys the game for himself (and for his fellow participant if the behavior was being reciprocated). This second aspect is an extension of the first in that irony is the cardinal rule of flirtation; it is assumed as the head of the structure of implied rules of flirtation regardless of other perceived individual rules in particular instances of the game. Finally, the flirtee exists representationally in the flirter’s imagination as arbiter, judge, and referee in relation to the flirter and the established system of rules in each instance of the game.

So what is the significance of the essence of acts of flirtation for Wheaton? I have only observations and questions. First, the game-like experience of flirtation on the part of the flirter, with the flirtee understood as referee and final judge, creates a distinct valuative system in which the flirter locates himself. The parallels between our existence as persons in God-governed moral space, and the flirter’s existence as a flirt in flirtee-governed flirtation space, are striking. I would wonder whether Wheaton students may derive some sense of their worth from their successes and failures in this arena, which would amount to an inappropriate surrendering of one’s self for another’s appraisal and evaluation. The game of flirtation would in this way fall into the same category as the Wheaton games of “maintaining an appearance of holiness for the public” and the less common “judging yourself and others by your comparative GPA’s.” The common thread running through these games is a desire for some kind of existential validation from the others surrounding each of us; though this desire is not intrinsically wrong in a moderate form, at its extreme, the relevant others are put (even if only momentarily) in the place of God, who has already spoken a final pertinent word on our value as creatures apart from our performance in any human-constructed evaluative context. A final note on this theme of the game-likeness of flirtation reaches beyond the analysis: the problems of the evaluative space created by my initiation of flirtation are enormously compounded with the introduction of other known flirters inclining towards my flirtee. A situation like this is potentially disastrous for everyone directly involved, and is excruciating to watch from the sidelines. In the aftermath of such complicated messes, I’m sure God hears many of those involved say: “why do you allow us to do these things to ourselves?”

A second line of observations has to do with the indirectness of flirtation. Flirting enables a way of playing with the idea of romance and relationship without the expectation of commitment, as is well known. This in part results from the refusal to explicitly acknowledge flirting as flirting for fear of the game’s destruction. I have irresponsibly flirted in the past, generating consequential attraction between myself and my reciprocating flirtee that neither of us intended to follow through on in a significant way. It is enjoyable to flirt with someone, especially when it is being well received – but the emotional consequences may eventually defeat whatever primary enjoyment was being derived from the game. Flirting with others whom you care for can lead to the harming and ultimate destruction of an otherwise healthy relationship, if no thought is given to the consequences or manner of flirtation. If flirting did involve some kind of commitment to the flirtee, people would not typically flirt with anyone they didn’t anticipate seeing again. As I understand things, it is in fact easiest to flirt with someone whom you do not anticipate seeing again, as it minimizes the chances of someone getting hurt while still creating space for the enjoyment of the game.

Furthermore, the constitutive dimension of irony opens wide the door to self-deception. It is common when engaged in flirtation to push conscious thematic awareness of it down, to force it to recede into the tacit periphery. When two people are involved in reciprocal flirtation, questions may naturally arise in their minds having to do with the ultimate ends of their interaction, but those questions are frequently disregarded for the sake of preserving the pleasantness of the moment. The feelings of the other person over time – for example, the state of the flirtee’s affections for the flirter going beyond the primary moment of his flirtation – may be passed over, ignored, reasoned out of existence in the mind of the flirter simply because they represent the unpleasantness of real consequences. These cases of self-deception can swell over time to form an immense psychic undertow of feelings of generalized anxiety, dread, and guilt over the tacit knowledge of one’s mistreatment of the flirtee and even one’s self. In extreme cases the microcosmic morality of the game of flirtation may even invite participants to compromise on their actual moral commitments.

It is clear that flirtation can be done with varying levels of integrity and responsibility. Though an enjoyable way to pass the time with an attractive friend, flirtation can be dangerous for those who (perhaps willfully) do not know what they are doing. I hope this analysis proves useful to those who would like to take the risk of initiating games of their own, if previously they have lacked sufficient confidence or trust in themselves and their motives. Assuming basic moral sensibilities, self-awareness and an eye for self-deception are crucial precautions for playing outside without hurting others or getting hurt yourself. And so, as the warm weather of spring rolls over our still-thawing campus, I say, with mild reservations, let the games begin. In fact, I believe they already have. Please understand that with this sentence, we are no longer flirting.

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[1] This, uh, happened a long time ago.

[2] I feel obligated to comment on the fact that the flirters in my examples are all male, as is the general perspective taken throughout. This is not sexism; I’m just committed to the idea of only writing about what I know something about – a very limited set of things not including first-person experience as a female. Too be clear, I believe with all my heart that females can be flirters too.

[3] Empathy is meant in a technical sense: I have the capacity to empathize if I am able to project someone else’s first-person mental content for myself in such a way as to be then able to anticipate how they will react to something, such as my acts of flirtation.

[4] Apocalypse: read in two senses – the first as Armageddon, with the destruction of the game, and the second as Revelation (as this would signal the uncovering of a new side of the flirtee, with the loss of flirtee-status).

Marty Jones is a senior philosophy major from Lima, OH. Marty lives at the Scottage, and does not consider himself a flirt.